3: 381403. Considering the difficult terrain and porous borders of its neighbors, the prospect of instability in the Levant spilling over into Russias restive Caucasus region is a problem no Russian national security analyst or official can ignore. As a result, their relations with the EU suffered, in large measure due to Europes dim view and criticism of their domestic political developments.52 Russia and Turkey, each following the vision of its leader, morphed into Europes outcasts with similar, though not identical, grievances against their European would-be partners. Russian-Israeli trade grew by 25percent in 2017, even if it is still a relatively small total amount at about $2billion. 2022 The Wilson Center. However, the Middle East was not home to any major power that could meaningfully join the Russia-China-India coalition. 106 Egypt, Russia Sign Deal to Build a Nuclear Power Plant, Reuters, November 19, 2015 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-russia-egypt-idUSKCN0T81YY20151119; and Egypt to Start Building Nuclear Plant in Next Two Years, Reuters, July 1, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-russia-nuclearpower/egypt-says-to-start-building-nuclear-plant-in-next-two-years-idUSKBN1JR1M0. Israel and Russia have had visa-free travel since 2008. 62 Macron Tells Erdogan: No Chance of Turkey Joining EU, BBC, January 5, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42586108; Richard A. Fuchs, Merkels Delicate Mission to Turkey, Deutsche Welle, February 1, 2017, https://www.dw.com/en/merkels-delicate-mission-to-turkey/a-37367606; Dorian Jones, Turkey Looks Back at Failed Coup, Voice of America, July 15, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/europe/turkey-looks-back-failed-coup; Turkey Coup: International Reaction, BBC, July 16, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36812863; Council of Europe: Turkey Must Separate Coup Plotters From Glen Employees, EURACTIV, September 8, 2016, https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/ecj-turkey-must-separate-coup-plotters-from-gulen-employees/; and Mark Landler, Obamas Support of Erdogan Is a Stark Reminder of Turkeys Value to U.S. New York Times, July 20, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/world/europe/obama-erdogan-turkey-coup-attempt.html. 57 Avedis K. Sanjian, The Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay): Its Impact on Turkish-Syrian Relations (1939-1956), Middle East Journal 10, no. Israel supports us in several channels, including at the UN. For most of the postCold War era, Iran and Iraq have been by far the biggest trading partners for Russia, while trade with the GCC lagged far behind.81. Arguably the most stable Russian relationship in North Africa has been with Libyas western neighbor Algeria. Netanyahu, for his part, spoke about the Soviet Armys decisive role in the victory over fascism and the great sacrifice of the Russian people. Paradoxically, Moscows and Tehrans joint success in reversing the course of the Syrian civil war revealed significant differences between their interests and agendas. 21 Robin Wright, Russia and Iran Deepen Ties to Challenge Trump and the United States, New Yorker, March 2, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/russia-and-iran-deepen-ties-to-challenge-trump-and-the-united-states. Besides their shared support for Assad, Russia and Egypt have sided with the Libyan National Army (LNA) and its leader General Khalifa Haftar. These smaller Persian Gulf monarchies and Russia have maintained active diplomatic engagement in recent years evidently prompted by the same factors that have energized Saudi engagement with Russia (see table 1)their shared interests in the energy sector, increased Russian activity in the Middle East, the challenge from Iran, and the uncertainty surrounding the role the United States would be willing and able to play in the region.98.

The initial deployment of Russian aircraft to the Hmeimim Air Base in September 2015 was followed by the deployment of advanced S-300 and S-400 air defense systems later that year, ostensibly prompted by the shoot down of the Russian aircraft by Turkish aircraft in November 2015.14 Though the air defense systems provided Russian aircraft operating over Syria with an additional edge over potential adversaries, the S-400s 400-kilometer range extended the Russian militarys ability to see and shoot at airborne targets over most of Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus, parts of Turkey, Israel, and Jordan. In this instance, too, the two have strong incentives to manage their relations constructively and avoid possible tensions. 23 Lessons From the Syrian States Return to the South, International Crisis Group Report no. However, its actions signaled to Algerias current and future leaders that Russia has little inclination to criticize their internal politics and is committed to the relationshipand, if necessary, to shielding them from international criticism of their domestic practices as long as its equities are protected. However, this is a hypothetical choice at best for Israel, Russia, and the Assad regime, since the task of consolidating the latters hold on power in all of Syria and returning it to the status quo ante is likely to prove impossible without a significant Iranian military presence in the country, because the Syrian army has sustained heavy losses in the course of the civil war.43 There appear to be few if any alternatives to a continued Iranian presence, and none of the parties involvedIsrael, Russia, or the Assad regimeis in a position to break out of this impasse.

In a complex, changing, and increasingly contested world, the Carnegie Endowment generates strategic ideas and independent analysis, supports diplomacy, and trains the next generation of international scholar-practitioners to help countries and institutions take on the most difficult global problems and safeguard peace. 76 Nikolai Litovkin, Russia Delivers First Weapons Supplies to Iraqi Kurds, Russia Beyond, March 18, 2016, https://www.rbth.com/defence/2016/03/18/russia-delivers-first-weapons-supplies-to-iraqi-kurds_576809; Thomas Grove and Ben Kesling, Russia Pursues Ties With Kurds to Keep Foothold in Region, Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-pursues-ties-with-kurds-to-keep-foothold-in-region-1461239887; Russia Supplies Arms to Kurds Against Turkey OSINT Group, UNIAN, February 6, 2018, https://www.unian.info/world/2384457-russia-supplies-arms-to-kurds-against-turkey-osint-group.html; and Russia Supplies the Kurds With Weapons and Ammunition to Fight the Turkish Army (VIDEO), Inform Napalm, February 9, 2018, https://informnapalm.org/en/russia-supplies-the-kurds-with-weapons-and-ammunition-to-fight-the-turkish-army-video/. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It appears that the combination of personal high-level diplomacy and Israeli insistence on responding to Iranian and Hezbollah strikes with overwhelming force has been met with understanding in the Kremlin. 45 Alexandra Dzhordzhevich. 118 Dmitry Gorenburg, Russias Naval Strategy in the Mediterranean, PONARS Eurasia, September 18, 2019, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/article/russias-naval-strategy-mediterranean; Stephen Blank, The Meaning of Russias Naval Deployments in the Mediterranean, Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 4, 2016, https://jamestown.org/program/the-meaning-of-russias-naval-deployments-in-the-mediterranean/. Both countries had compelling interests in Syria and incentives in supporting the Assad-led government. While expressions of interest have so far exceeded actual amounts invested, they are not to be dismissed. 3 (2015): 5770, https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere-2015-3-page-57.htm#; and Giorgio Cafiero, Russias Cautious Response To Algerias Deepening Political Crisis, March 25, 2019, Lobe Log, https://lobelog.com/russias-cautious-response-to-algerias-deepening-political-crisis/. In fact, for example, both Russia and Britain had great security and economic interest in the Persian Gulf and intervened several times in the country, both militarily and not. Notwithstanding Moscows success in building or restoring important ties in these regions, it has neither the means nor the ambition to fill the vacuum resulting from the United States pullback. How. As in other relationships between Russia and various parties to the Syrian conflict, both those directly and indirectly involved in it, the pivotal moment came with the deployment of Russian air and ground forces to Syria in the fall of 2015. The Saudi-American relation exacerbated Saudi relations with Nassers Egypt, a former non-aligned state which was moving closer to the Soviet Union. His guest of honor, featured prominently in numerous photographs from the event posted on the Kremlin website, was Netanyahu, the only Western leader in attendance. Where terrorism is now the one-word rationale for intervention in the Middle East, communism was once the focus of our fears. Its special relationship with Iran positioned it firmly at the table of major powers dealing with the mounting challenge of Tehrans nuclear pursuits. That appears to have not been the case. Each occupies a unique place in the international system where its influence is disproportionate to the size of its economy or defense budget, and both leaders understand that power and influence are about more than mere economics.

The Middle East was a primary area of contention (Khalidi, 2009). A successful intervention in Syria would demonstrate to Washington and Brussels that their policy of isolating Russia, marginalizing it in world affairs, and forcing it to retreat under the weight of U.S.-EU sanctions was doomed to fail; Russia could be neither marginalized nor isolated, and it would not retreat. 43 Irans Revolutionary Guards, Council on Foreign Relations, May 6, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards; War by Proxy: Irans Growing Footprint in the Middle East, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 11, 2019, https://www.csis.org/war-by-proxy; and Nir Boms and Stephane Cohen, Iran and the New State of Play in Southwest Syria, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, January 22, 2019, https://dayan.org/content/iran-and-new-state-play-southwest-syria. Neither side can deliver what the other wants. In the late 1950s and until the Cuban missiles crisis of 1962, American missiles launching submarines were based in Turkey; in the 1960s and for about a decade, when a longer range missiles technology became available, American submarines were in Spain, with Soviet antisubmarine naval forces and air units based in Egypt and Turkey. The fact that the Arab Spring followed the invasion of Iraq, undertaken in the name of democratizing the region; then president Barack Obamas Cairo speech in 2009; and then secretary of state Hillary Clintons statements in 2012 that the Assad regime had lost its legitimacy and must go supplied further proof of Washingtons unilateral, unipolar, disruptive agenda in the Middle East.7. 104 Russia Secures $2Bln Fighter Jet Contract With Egypt Reports, Moscow Times, March 18, 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/03/18/russia-secures-2bln-fighter-jet-contract-with-egypt-reports-a64842; and Egypt Signs $2bn Deal for 50 Fighter Jets From Russia, Middle East Monitor, August 27, 2019, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190827-egypt-signs-2bn-deal-for-50-fighter-jets-from-russia/. 75 Fehim Tastekin, Turkey, Syrian Kurds Remain at Odds in Safe Zone Visions, Al-Monitor, August 19, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/08/turkey-syria-united-states-kurds-at-odds-in-safe-zone-plans.html#ixzz5znIl99cH; Ellen Francis, Let Down by U.S., Syrian Kurdish Leaders Look to Russia and Assad, Reuters, December 27, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-kurds/let-down-by-us-syrian-kurdish-leaders-look-to-russia-and-assad-idUSKCN1OQ18E; and Gonul Tol, Why Is Turkey Silent on Russias Cooperation With the Syrian Kurds?.

4 (Autumn 1956): 37994; and Mahmut Bali Aykan, The Turkish-Syrian Crisis of October 1998: A Turkish View.. 16 Alessandra Stanley, Yeltsin and Netanyahu Meet and Talk Business, New York Times, March 12, 1997, https://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/12/world/yeltsin-and-netanyahu-meet-and-talk-business.html. After two unsuccessful wars with transformational goalsin Iraq and Afghanistanand with U.S. focus increasingly on the Asia Pacific theater, the goal of transforming the Middle East and solving its many problems is unlikely to guide U.S. policy in the region. In the Persian Gulf, where the relationship with Saudi Arabia has reached historic highs, Moscow appears similarly unwilling and unable to take sides between Riyadh and Tehran let alone moderate escalating tensions. Russian interests will not be well served by an escalation of tensions in various parts of the region. Finally, as Halliday (1997) pointed out, the Cold War competition had also another role in the region. 9 Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi and Raffaello Pantucci, Understanding Irans Role in the Syrian Conflict, RUSI International, August 1, 2016, https://www.rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/understanding-irans-role-syrian-conflict. With Syria engulfed in a full-scale civil war, Russia justified its support for the Assad regime as a legitimate form of assistance to a friendly government under assault from illegal, foreign-inspired, and foreign-supplied opposition groups and terrorist cells. Reconciling them while Russia pursues a more expansive agenda in the Middle East is and will continue to be a complicated diplomatic challenge for Moscow. Russian cooperation with Egypt in support of Haftar is an important contributing factor in the bilateral relationship with Egypt. 115 Nathaniel Reynolds, Putins Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and the Wagner Group, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 8, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/07/08/putin-s-not-so-secret-mercenaries-patronage-geopolitics-and-wagner-group-pub-79442. However unsettled they may have been by the imagery of the Arab Spring and the fall of Mubarak, Russian leaders took a pragmatic stance with regard to his successor Mohamed Morsi, even though the Russian government had designated Morsis Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization and had banned it in Russia since 2003.101 Morsi traveled to Russia and met with Putin in April 2013, but the visit was apparently largely symbolic, with little practical effect for bilateral relations.102.

The fact that the United States was willing to jettison Mubarak, a loyal U.S. ally of some three decades, in the name of democratic change must have been especially unsettling for Russian elites. Russia has positioned itself as a valuable interlocutor to all parties to the regions conflicts. In the meantime, Iran also emerged as a critical participant in the conflict willing to intervene with boots on the ground.9 Tehrans and Moscows confluence of interests in supporting Bashar al-Assad reinforced their partnership, with Russia providing extensive material and diplomatic assistance, as well as intelligence support, to the embattled Syrian regime, and Iran providing the manpower to fight the regimes opponents.10. Russian involvement in the Syrian civil war was a matter of both necessity and opportunity. It was to be opposed, as it was in the nineteenth century, when the United Kingdom and France fought Russia in Crimea; competed against, as the United States and its allies sought to do throughout the Cold War; but not questioned as an aberration. The impact of these developments did not take long to manifest in a major improvement in Russia-Saudi relations. In the summer of 2015, it was in danger of being defeated by a combination of the Islamic State and anti-Assad opposition forces.11 With the status quo unsustainable, the Kremlin faced two fundamentally different choices: to let the Assad regime collapse or to intervene militarily and attempt to save it. Russia is interested in returning Syria to the status quo ante and reaping the benefits of peace and reconstruction. In the aftermath of the Suez crisis, in which both superpowers have supported Egypt and the Arab states against Israel, French and Britain, the pre-war Saudi-American relationship was cemented by the Eisenhower Doctrine and Saudi adherence to it. 29 Dan Williams, Israel Can Beat Russian-Supplied S-300 Air Shield in Syria: Minister, Reuters, October 3, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-s300-israel/israel-can-beat-russian-supplied-s-300-air-shield-in-syria-minister-idUSKCN1MD28W; Oren Liebermann, Israel Strikes Iranian Targets in Damascus After Missile Fired at Golan Heights, CNN, January 22, 2019, https://www-m.cnn.com/2019/01/21/middleeast/israel-strikes-iran-targets-syria-intl/index.html; and Seth J. Frantzman, Why Hasnt Syria Used the S-300?, Jerusalem Post, January 21, 2019, https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Why-hasnt-Syria-used-the-S-300-578172. In multiple exchanges of visits by Russian and Egyptian leaders and top officials since 2013, the two governments reached multiple agreements for cooperation.103 While the exact dollar amount of Russian arms sales to Egypt is not known, the two countries have concluded several multi-billion-dollar deals for the sale of dozens of fighter jets, helicopters, and other weapons system.104 Other agreements included energy projects, nuclear power plant construction, and a broad statement on comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation.105, However, despite the impressive number of agreements signed, few apparently have moved to the implementation stage. However, under the leadership of then president Anwar Sadat, Egypt pivoted toward partnership with the United States. In terms of its economic and financial impact on the world stage, diplomatic importance and geopolitical sway, and military capabilities, Russia falls short of the ideal partner the Gulf states apparently desire. Official Israeli statements minimized the impact of the S-300 delivery to Syria on Israeli security; indeed, the Israeli Air Force again struck Iranian targets in Syria in January 2019 notwithstanding the S-300 delivery.29, Russias relationship with Israel remains a complex balancing act. There appears to be no feasible (let alone easy) way for Russia to break through this impasse. bomb soviet nuclear atomic union russia joe russian lightning 1949 tests soviets cold war history bomba hydrogen its worlds second It was Netanyahus second visit to Russia in 2018 alone, and his eleventh visit since his reelection in 2013.19, The two leaders backgrounds could hardly be more different. 96 Raft of Multimillion-Dollar Deals Seal Putins Visit to Saudi Arabia, Arab News, October 14, 2019, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1568681/saudi-arabia ; Henry Meyer, Oil Asiuad, Putins Saudi Bromance Yet to Yield Dividends, Bloomberg, October 13, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-13/oil-aside-putin-s-saudi-bromance-so-far-yields-few-dividends. Moscows indifferent stance toward Algerian domestic developments may seem lacking true commitment to partnership and may have disappointed Bouteflikas supporters. The refusal of the Obama administration to follow through on the threat to strike Assads targets in Syria to punish the regime for chemical attacks in 2013 and the decision to limit U.S. military involvement in Syria to a campaign against the Islamic State sent a powerful message to all concerned that the United States was intent on limiting its exposure in the Middle East. 20 Jacqueline Thomsen, McCain: Putin Is Evil and Intent on Evil Deeds, Hill, October 5, 2018, https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/387199-mccain-putin-is-evil-and-intent-on-evil-deeds. Russias pursuit of a partnership with Iran became a significant stumbling block to better ties between Moscow and the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Georgians are ruefully beginning to realize, the cost for Georgia may prove to be great, which I show in these pages was also the case for small Middle Eastern clients of the superpowers throughout the Cold War, and of the United States since then. By contrast, Russia does not appear to be indispensable. Unofficial but influential U.S. voices reinforced that message by arguing that the United States newfound energy bounty would free it from dependence on Persian Gulf oil and present it with a range of previously unavailable geopolitical options.87. Moscow and Tehran apparently have differing approaches to rebuilding the Syrian army.39 Some Russian business interests have looked at the prospect of Syrian reconstruction as a commercial opportunity, for which an end to the conflict is obviously a precondition.40 In that case, too, they may have to compete against Iranian interests also seeking payoff for Irans role in the war.41. By relying largely on airpower, the Russian military was able to operate virtually unopposed, for the antigovernment forces had few if any air defense capabilities. Russian officials charged that their victory could have turned Syria into a hotbed of international terrorism that would then spread its tentacles beyond Syria, including to Russia and Central Asia. There are multiple reasons for caution. The author is grateful to Michele Dunne, Thomas E. Graham, Rajan Menon, Aaron David Miller, Karim Sadjadpour, Richard Sokolsky, Paul Stronski, Frederic Wehrey, and Andrew Weiss for their exceptionally helpful and constructive comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 88 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Saudis Offer Russia Secret Oil Deal if It Drops Syria, Telegraph, August 27, 2013, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/10266957/Saudis-offer-Russia-secret-oil-deal-if-it-drops-Syria.html; and Patrick Wintour, Saudi Kings Visit to Russia Heralds Shift in Global Power Structures, Guardian, October 5, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/05/saudi-russia-visit-putin-oil-middle-east. Sharon visited Russia on several occasions, and Putin visited Israel in 2005.

The desire to protect its special relationship with Israel is a further motivating factor for Russia to limit Iranian influence in Syria and end the conflict.42 Russian interests in Syria are quite compatible with those of Israel. This discussion of Sowing Crisis with Rashid Khalidi took place on March 5, 2009 at the Politics and Prose bookstore in Washington, D.C.

15 Russian Military Capabilities in Event of Western Strike on Syria, Reuters, April 12, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-factbox/russian-military-capabilities-in-event-of-western-strike-on-syria-idUSKBN1HJ2TE; and Kyle Mizokami, Russia Blows Up Junked Warship in Provocative Missile Test, Popular Mechanics, April 26, 2018, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a20067237/russian-blows-up-junked-warship-in-provocative-missile-test/. Diplomatic relations between Russia and Israel were restored only in 1991. Disclaimer: This is an example of a student written essay.Click here for sample essays written by our professional writers. Reprinted by permission of Beacon Press. This process is only likely to accelerate in the foreseeable future. Since the kings visit, the Moscow-Riyadh relationship has continued on an upward trajectory. 5 World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution database, https://wits.worldbank.org/Default.aspx?lang=en. We've received widespread press coverage since 2003, Your UKEssays purchase is secure and we're rated 4.4/5 on reviews.co.uk. Their motorised forces, in fact, were crucially dependent on oil for their propulsion, as were their navies and air forces (Khalidi, 2009). With the United States and its allies either having largely pulled back from efforts to put an end to the conflict or pursuing their own interests in the war-torn country, in a way Russia has been given a free hand to back Haftar and the LNA.113, However, Russian support for Haftar and the LNA appears to have been quite limited in scope. 73 Lefteris Pitarakis and Bassem Mroue, Syrian Kurdish-Led Force Says It Will Abide by Cease-Fire, Associated Press, October 17, 2019, https://www.apnews.com/c27ec5d2fa3b4954a65bc359f497a22a. nato alliance countries military members war cold nations states united timeline map 1949 formed european africa north un treaty many Nicole Ng and Aleksandar Vladicic provided outstanding research assistance. Even so, the Times noted that President Obama might want to read this book, if for no other reason than to be reminded "how very hard it is to make progress in a region where memories are long, and practically everything is blamed on the U.S. (or Israel).". Netanyahus visit to Moscow on May 9, 2018, was an example of apparent Russian-Israeli coordination and management of this potentially explosive issue. The fall of the Assad regime would have been an embarrassment for the Kremlin, which had positioned itself as Assads protector and as the supporter of legitimate (if unpopular) governments threatened by domestic instability and terrorism. In the 1990s and early 2000s, both countries implemented major domestic reforms, each pursuing its own path toward closer relations with Europe. Russia seems resurgent from the Persian Gulf to North Africa especially as the United States, worn out by nearly two decades of endless wars, appears eager to minimize its commitments in the region. This was true even before the recent recrudescence of American-Russian tensions in and around the Middle East, as starting in the 1990s the United States built more bases and poured more troops and equipment into the region than at any time since World War II.

The intervention took place against the backdrop of a United States pulling back from the Middle East and growing uncertainty about its future role there. The legacy of World War II is essential to both leaders narratives. Saudi King Salmans 2017 visit to Moscow was a historic first, and the two energy superpowers have pledged to coordinate their oil export policies, but much like the Israelis, the Saudis are likely to be disappointed in their hope that better relations with Russia could lead it to abandon its partnership with Iran. They are much more likely to be served better by a shared understanding with the United States aimed at managing instability and preventing tensions from escalating. The Kremlin appears careful not to overextend itself and content to remain as an indispensable actorone whose presence is necessary, even if not sufficient, to address the regions many problems.

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